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I   INTRODUCTION 
 
A constitutional referendum on secession from Indonesia was held in East Timor 
in 1999, with a pro-independence vote triggering widespread violence by the 
Indonesian army and pro-union militia.1 Montenegro underwent a similar process in 
2006, also opting for independence but with much smoother results.2 This article will 
suggest that the deliberative democratic principle of reciprocity can help deliver 
referendum law based on justifications that can be accepted by all parties concerned. In 
particular, it proposes that reciprocity can be operationalised in referendum law if the 
participants in the negotiations that formulate the laws accept fair terms of social 
cooperation (FTSCs) and resolve disagreements using economy of moral disagreement 
(EMD). Respectively, these mean parties to negotiations should be willing to justify 
their position in mutually acceptable terms and if consensus is impossible, agreements 
should minimise their rejection of other parties’ views. This argument will be made 
using the negotiations that created East Timor and Montenegro’s referendum laws as 
case studies.  
Secession referenda are a timely issue. They have become the default mechanism 
for founding new states, triggering secession for Eritrea (1993), East Timor (1999), 
Montenegro (2006) and South Sudan (2011).3 Earlier this year, a referendum was used 
to justify Crimea’s transfer from Ukraine to Russia,4 and another was held to determine 
whether Scotland should remain part of the UK.5 A referendum on Iraqi Kurdish 
secession planned for 2014 was recently postponed,6 while Bougainville and New 
Caledonia are also expected to vote on independence later this decade.7 Their 
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frequency, along with their potential to stir up division and inflame differences in 
volatile circumstances,8 makes secession referenda an important area for investigation.    
This article will use secession referenda in East Timor and Montenegro as case 
studies to suggest that the micro-level negotiations which often create referendum law 
can achieve outcomes that are consistent with the deliberative democratic principle of 
reciprocity if parties accept FTSCs and if the negotiations include a wide range of 
participants and are firmly moderated by an impartial third party.  
Broadly speaking, reciprocity as described by Gutmann and Thompson aims to 
facilitate political agreement on the basis of principles that are mutually justifiable to 
all parties concerned.9 Tierney identifies two key stages besides voting when citizens 
engage with constitutional referenda: micro-level participation, or small-group 
deliberation when legal guidelines for the referendum are being established; and 
macro-level participation, meaning engagement during the campaign period through 
considering and debating the relevant issues.10 To try to ensure the process is accepted 
even by those who disagree with the result, Tierney suggests that decision-making 
during micro-level negotiations should aim to build up openness and goodwill between 
the parties, and to reach agreement through discussion wherever possible.11 However 
he does not clearly outline practical steps for achieving these goals.12 This paper aims 
to flesh out Tierney’s ideas by outlining a theoretical framework that merges Gutmann 
and Thompson’s principle of reciprocity with Tierney’s suggestion that popular 
participation should be incorporated into micro-level participation in constitutional 
referenda.  
The first section will engage with these theories at a broad level, concluding that 
micro-level negotiations can create laws based on reciprocity if the parties accept 
FTSCs and resolve fundamental disagreements using EMD, and that these can be 
encouraged through representative participation and impartial mediation. This is a 
novel response to gaps in Tierney’s ideas. Ensuring parties accept FTSCs and resolve 
disagreements using EMD offers a pragmatic scheme for reaching mutually justifiable 
solutions using Tierney’s framework.           
To establish a base for analysis, the second section will summarise the contents of 
the May 5 Agreement that established East Timor’s referendum law, as well as the Law 
on the Referendum on State Legal Status (LRSLS) which served the same role in 
Montenegro. Both of these were formed through negotiation – between Indonesia, 
Portugal and the UN for Timor,13 and between pro-independence and pro-union 
politicians in Montenegro, moderated by the European Union (EU).14   
The third section will apply the theory to the law, focusing on reciprocity in 
micro-level participation. It will argue that micro-level negotiations can achieve 
solutions based on reciprocity if parties accept FTSCs and resolve fundamental moral 
disagreements using EMD. These can be encouraged by representative participation 
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and impartial mediation in negotiations. The application section will use key 
components of East Timor and Montenegro’s referendum laws to demonstrate that 
these principles can work in practice. Campaign regulations during each referendum 
will be discussed because they were relatively detailed in both cases and thus permit 
direct comparisons. Negotiations on the most controversial issues – security 
arrangements in East Timor and the supermajority requirement in Montenegro – will 
also be considered because they provide the clearest examples of good or bad practice. 
Negotiations on East Timor’s referendum law did not achieve reciprocal results 
because they lacked East Timorese input and were dominated by Indonesia which was 
enabled to thwart negotiations by a weak United Nations (UN) mediation effort. 
Conversely in Montenegro, negotiations yielded highly-appropriate and effective 
referendum laws based on reciprocity. Representative participation from both sides of 
the debate, and the EU’s role as a neutral facilitator, were crucial to achieving this 
outcome. These case studies demonstrate reciprocity’s potential to guide micro-level 
participation if FTSCs and EMD are encouraged through assertive, impartial mediation 
and if a representative range of participants is included.  
 
 
II   RECIPROCITY’S PLACE IN CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDA 
 
This section will first describe various criticisms of constitutional referenda. It 
will then outline the principle of reciprocity and its potential benefits. Next, it will set 
out Tierney’s suggestion for micro-level participation in referenda, and suggest that 
orienting this framework to achieve outcomes that are based on reciprocity could 
mitigate many of the weaknesses of constitutional referenda. Finally, it will argue that 
this could be accomplished in micro-level negotiations if parties accept FTSCs and 
reach agreements based on EMD, both of which can be encouraged by representative 
participation and impartial mediation.  
 
A   Criticisms of Referenda 
 
Scholars have identified a number of problems with constitutional referenda. 
They fall generally under three categories: elite control, a deliberation deficit and 
majoritarianism.  
The first criticism suggests referenda are undermined by elite control. Their 
organisation is generally the responsibility of elites, who deploy them as a convenient 
solution to constitutional or political problems, or to legitimise a change of regime.15 
Elite groups’ power to influence whether referenda are held, and determine the 
wording of the question and rules governing the referendum process makes most 
referenda ‘controlled and pro-hegemonic’.16 When key powers over referenda are 
controlled by a small elite, referenda can be criticised for reinforcing the status quo 
rather than reflecting the popular will or public interest.17 Qvortup recently disputed 
this elite control criticism on the basis that elite groups often have no discretion 
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regarding whether referenda are held.18 However important decisions, such as the 
referendum question, media and campaign regulations and eligibility requirements for 
participation, among others, are still made by elite groups.       
An associated problem ensues: elite control of constitutional referenda contributes 
to a deliberation deficit, with the public failing to fully engage with the issues.19 For 
instance, they are generally held quickly; the question presented to voters can be 
confusing; and voters rarely have the time or interest in the relevant issues to properly 
understand and engage with referenda.20 If there is little possibility that voters will 
formulate opinions based on a careful consideration of the issues at stake, a 
referendum’s result might not reflect the public interest. For instance, the 1906 
Australian referendum on changing the beginning of Senators’ terms from 1 January to 
1 July was easily carried since ‘the average voter … does not care how frequently a 
senator rotates’.21 Because there was limited debate leading up to the referendum, 
some of its consequences – such as forcing incoming senators to wait long periods of 
time before taking up their seats – were unintended.22 
Finally, as a majoritarian mode of decision-making, constitutional referenda have 
the potential to marginalise minorities and dissenting individuals. Majorities 
participating in referenda tend to disregard the interests of minority groups,23 if only in 
referenda that concern minority rights where minority and majority interests directly 
conflict.24  
Additionally, unlike general elections, where parties will consider minority 
perspectives on issues that are particularly significant to them, referenda place no 
weight on the intensity of participants’ beliefs.25 The majority will always decide 
matters raised in referenda – even those they are largely ambivalent about, but which 
minorities consider extremely important.26 As a result, referenda have the potential to 
discriminate against minority interests. For instance, Gamble examined 74 civil rights 
initiatives voted on in state or local ballots in the United States between 1959 and 
1993, and found that those aiming to protect minority interests were defeated 78% of 
the time.27    
Addressing these issues is particularly important in secession referenda. 
Compared to ordinary constitutional referenda, secession referenda are particularly 
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divisive and likely to inflame differences. Furthermore, secession is a difficult process 
to undo. The finality of the referendum results amplifies the majoritarian danger – if a 
referendum is irreversible, special care should be taken to ensure it does not adversely 
impact minority rights.28  
As Tierney suggests, there is a pressing need to respond to these issues. The next 
section will describe the principle of reciprocity, which has the potential to address 
many of these shortcomings.  
 
B   What is Reciprocity? 
 
Broadly speaking, ‘reciprocity holds that citizens owe one another justifications 
for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact’.29 It aims to 
facilitate political agreement on the basis of principles that are mutually justifiable to 
all parties concerned.30 Principles are mutually justifiable if they appeal to reasons that 
all similarly-motivated parties can accept.31 Parties will not be similarly motivated if 
they reject FTSCs by refusing to press their claims in terms that are accessible to their 
fellow citizens.32 For example, asserting that a law should be passed because God 
commands it is not an accessible reason to citizens who do not share the same 
connection with that particular deity.33 So reciprocity is based on the substance of the 
reasons given in support of a position.34 It requires that these reasons are both mutually 
acceptable and widely-distributed.35  
An example from US politics illustrates reciprocity: during the 2010 Republican 
primaries, conservative politician Ken Buck suggested Coloradoan Republicans should 
vote for him because ‘I do not wear high heels. She [an opposing candidate] has 
questioned my manhood and I think it’s fair to respond. I have cowboy boots’.36 If his 
statement is seen as compelling people to vote for him because of his cowboy boots, 
this justification lacks reciprocity. It relies on assumptions that could not be reasonably 
accepted by people who attach less importance to footwear. Conversely his arguments 
in favour of raising the retirement age do not violate the principle of reciprocity: ‘as 
                                                 
28  Ibid 265.  
29  Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University 
Press, 2004) 98.  
30  William Galston, ‘Democracy and Disagreement: A Review’ (1998) 108(3) Ethics 607, 608.  
31  Iris Marion Young, ‘Justice, Inclusion and Deliberative Democracy’ in Stephen Macedo (ed) 
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 
1999) 151, 152.  
32  Robert P George, ‘Democracy and Moral Disagreement: Reciprocity, Slavery, and Abortion’ 
in Stephen Macedo (ed) Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 184, 188.  
33  Dennis F Thompson, ‘Public Reason and Precluded Reasons’ (2004) 72(5) Fordham Law 
Review 2073, 2084. 
34  Alan Wertheimer, ‘Internal Disagreements: Deliberation and Abortion’ in Stephen Macedo 
(ed) Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 170, 181.  
35  Gutmann and Thompson, above n 29, 98.   
36  Janie Lorber, ‘In Colorado Race, a Focus on Footwear’, The New York Times (online), 22 
July 2010 <http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/in-colorado-race-a-focus-on-
footwear/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0>. 
144 University of Queensland Law Journal 2015 
 
life expectancy increases, the retirement date for benefits increases also’.37 This 
justification appeals to practical concerns about funding retirement benefits that a 
reasonable person could accept, even if they do not agree with the result. 
Rawls’ idea of public reason is similar to Gutmann and Thompson’s principle of 
reciprocity. Like Gutmann and Thompson, Rawls considered the sorts of justifications 
that citizens should provide for the policies they support. He concluded that citizens 
should rely on public reason, ‘appealing only to a public conception of justice’.38 This 
is similar to Gutmann and Thompson’s description of reciprocity as the principle that 
citizens should provide one another with mutually acceptable justifications for the 
binding laws and policies they enact.39 Yet the two concepts remain distinct. Gutmann 
and Thompson are more flexible, allowing some appeals to moral values that would be 
rejected by Rawls.40 They emphasise accessibility, suggesting that citizens should be 
able to appeal to the truth as they see it, ‘as long as it is a truth that others can 
appreciate (but not necessarily accept)’.41 Conversely, Rawls’ strictest approach states 
that citizens should appeal ‘only to a public conception of justice, and not the whole 
truth as they see it’.42  
As a consequence, Rawls does not address what Gutmann and Thompson call 
‘deliberative disagreements’.43 Deliberative disagreements are conflicts based on moral 
reasons that are so deeply divisive that agreements cannot be reached despite both 
parties accepting FTSCs.44 For instance, both sides in the abortion debate can provide 
mutually accessible justifications for their positions – either that foetuses are human 
beings with rights that should be protected, or that women should be free to live their 
own lives and control their own bodies.45 Faced with this disagreement, Rawls insists 
persevering with public reason will eventually yield an overlapping consensus based 
on a ‘morally significant core of commitments common to the reasonable fragment of 
each of the comprehensive doctrines in society’.46 On the other hand, Gutmann and 
Thompson permit moral justifications so long as their proponents accept FTSCs, 
phrasing them in terms that are accessible to fellow citizens.47 To resolve deliberative 
disagreements, Gutmann and Thompson devised a series of ‘principles of 
accommodation’ based on mutual respect.48 Accommodation aims to achieve solutions 
that are mutually agreeable to conflicting parties despite their ostensibly contradictory 
positions.49   
In seeking a negotiation, these principles of accommodation require listening to 
other parties, open-mindedness, trying to acknowledge and understand their position, 
and seeking solutions based on EMD.50 EMD means that justifications for policies 
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should minimise their rejection of the opposing position.51 Returning to the abortion 
debate, an example would be restricting abortion to a certain period after conception. 
This allows women to terminate unwanted pregnancies, but also considers the pro-
lifers’ stance, preventing more developed foetuses from being aborted. Larmore’s 
universal norm of rational dialogue covers similar ground to EMD, proposing that two 
parties in disagreement should seek solutions that the other does not reject.52 However 
unlike Larmore, who seeks a neutral solution that parties do not disagree with, 
Gutmann and Thompson’s EMD aims to find common ground between the parties.53 
Imagine two people sharing a dinner – one enjoys shellfish and dislikes carrots, while 
the other loves retro food but dislikes basil. Applying Larmore, the diners could decide 
on any meal that does not contain carrots or basil, while applying Gutmann and 
Thompson’s EMD might lead them to settle on common ground: oysters kilpatrick.  
 
C   Benefits of Reciprocity 
 
An important quality of successful negotiations is provisionality, meaning parties 
should be open to considering others’ suggestions and modifying their own positions. 
Reciprocity can help achieve this. Endeavouring to give reasons that could be 
reasonably accepted by others implies also considering reasonable suggestions offered 
by others.54 As a result, participants in negotiations should be more willing to change 
their views. Encouraging the provisionality of beliefs by promoting reflection and the 
consideration of alternative arguments is one of reciprocity’s main benefits.  
Reciprocity can also improve policy-making. Augmenting decision-making with 
an ongoing process of mutual reason-giving has instrumental benefits: reciprocity 
tends to deliver successful policies because they must be justified in terms that are 
mutually acceptable.55 Reciprocity can encourage citizens and government officials to 
use substantive principles to understand, rethink and resolve moral disagreement in 
politics.56 By doing so, it can help prevent unrealistic or contradictory preferences.57 
The result is more effective, inclusive policies. This will be seen later in relation to 
East Timor and Montenegro’s referendum laws.  
Another of reciprocity’s primary strengths is its expressive value.58 This means 
that it encourages citizens to treat one another with mutual respect despite inevitable 
political disagreements.59 Justifying outcomes in mutually acceptable terms encourages 
a constructive approach to interaction with, and a favourable attitude towards, people 
with whom you disagree.60 Furthermore, because it ensures policies are debated and 
implemented with respect for differing perspectives, reciprocity fosters democratically 
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permissible coercion.61 In other words, basing policies on reciprocity can help 
legitimise decisions that were not made unanimously.        
 
D   Micro-Participation in Referenda 
 
Departing briefly from reciprocity, this paper will now outline Tierney’s 
suggestions for facilitating popular participation in constitutional referenda. Tierney 
notes that voting alone does not necessarily encourage active and meaningful citizen 
engagement with referenda.62 As a result, he investigates other forms of popular 
participation that could easily be incorporated into the referendum process. There are 
two key stages: micro-level participation at the issue-framing and question-setting 
stage; and macro-level participation during the referendum campaign.63 This section 
will focus on micro-level deliberation.       
In micro-level citizen participation, small groups of citizens with some claim to 
being representative of the wider public are convened to discuss significant issues 
surrounding a referendum.64 This form of participation is best suited to the issue-
framing and question-setting stage of the referendum.65 For instance, Canada’s 
‘Citizens’ Assemblies’ gathered over 100 randomly-selected voters to participate in 
several months of learning, public consultation and debate before issuing a 
recommendation for new provincial electoral systems.66 Representative small-group 
deliberation encourages public reasoning and debate, promoting the consideration of 
and acceptance or rejection of ideas.67 It also enables minority perspectives to be 
voiced.68 Tierney suggests micro-level participation is well-suited to deciding how the 
referendum issue to be put to the people should be framed as well as to formulating fair 
guidelines for the referendum process.69  This precludes the usual elite dominance of 
referendum organisation. 
There are practical difficulties inherent in micro-level deliberation. The 
legitimacy of the process depends on some form of large-scale participation.70 As 
Benhabib writes, ‘legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought to result 
from the free and unconstrained deliberation of all about all matters of common 
concern’.71 One method of dealing with this problem is by choosing representative 
participants for small-scale deliberation through popular elections.72 This approach was 
taken in Montenegro, where the referendum law was devised by a representative panel 
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of democratically-elected politicians.73 Alternatively, random sampling could be used 
to create representative groups for small-scale deliberation.74     
 
 
 
E   Reciprocity in Micro-Level Participation 
 
1   Reciprocity and the Weaknesses of Referenda 
 
A stronger emphasis on reciprocity in the referendum process could address many 
of the drawbacks of constitutional referenda. One example would be the majoritarian 
problem described earlier. Tierney suggests that for a referendum to be genuinely 
inclusive of minority groups, deliberation must be non-coercive and non-domineering, 
meaning genuine attempts are made to reach agreements that are acceptable to all 
parties.75 However he does not specify how this ideal should be implemented. 
Gutmann and Thompson fill this void. As will be demonstrated in the third section, 
their principle of reciprocity forms the basis for a practical framework that minimises 
coercion in micro-level negotiations. Depending on how participants are selected, 
reciprocity at the micro level could also mitigate the majoritarian problem by giving 
minorities a chance to express their views without being drowned out by the majority 
in aggregative voting. 
The problem of elite control over referenda can also be addressed by reciprocity. 
For decisions in small-group deliberation at the issue-framing or question-setting stage 
to be based on reciprocity, they must provide sufficient opportunities for parties 
affected to provide and discuss justifications for their views, and these contributions 
should be taken into account when the final decision is made.76 This requirement 
would weaken elite groups’ otherwise wide discretion to decide whether or when 
referenda are held, the wording of the question and the rules governing the 
procedure.77 Furthermore, reaching decisions based on EMD ensures all positions – 
including those of minorities – are considered.  
 
2   Reciprocity Within Tierney’s Framework 
 
More specifically for this paper, reciprocity can flesh out Tierney’s ideas on 
micro-level deliberation. Tierney does briefly raise the issue of reciprocity, but in 
relation to decision-making through voting rather than negotiations early in the 
referendum process.78 This overlooks its potential to guide micro-level participation. 
Although Tierney establishes a framework for incorporating participation into the 
referendum process, he offers few guidelines for effectively conducting this 
participation. In particular, he laments that micro-level deliberation must end in 
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decisions that are unlikely to be unanimous,79 but does not explain how disagreements 
between parties in micro-level discussions should be overcome to reach more 
consensual decisions. Similarly, he describes various goals for micro participation, like 
formulating agreement through discussion and promoting openness and goodwill 
between participants,80 but does not articulate a detailed vision for how these should be 
achieved. Reciprocity can fill this gap. Unlike the majority of the relevant literature, 
Gutmann and Thompson focus on procedural constraints on deliberation.81 They stress 
that participants in discussions must actually give reasons that can be accepted by other 
participants.82 From this assertion they extrapolate two procedural ideals: parties to 
negotiations should accept FTSCs, and should resolve deliberative disagreements 
through EMD. This adds detail to Tierney’s framework, explaining how disagreements 
in micro-level participation can be overcome to achieve the consensus-based decisions 
he favours.  
Endeavouring to promote reciprocity in micro-level negotiations should facilitate 
the openness, goodwill and consensus-building Tierney seeks. As discussed earlier, 
reciprocity’s expressive value means that it promotes mutual respect between citizens 
and helps them to understand each other’s positions.83 Micro-level negotiations can be 
consciously structured to encourage reciprocal outcomes. Participants’ roles and 
interactions in a decision-making process can be set up to promote characteristics of 
effective deliberation, such as reciprocity.84 The third section will argue that 
representative participation and firm but impartial mediation can help ensure micro-
level negotiations reach solutions that are based on reciprocity. Representative 
participation implies that two conditions are met: a wide spectrum of affected interests 
should be represented,85 and participants should be able to present their views and 
contribute to solutions on approximately equal footings. As will be seen later, the 
negotiations that created Montenegro’s referendum law were characterised by the 
exchange of justifications on FTSCs, with deliberative disagreements resolved through 
compromises based on EMD. By contrast, negotiations on the East Timorese 
referendum law lacked reciprocity. Indonesia’s overbearing approach rejected FTSCs, 
and the absence of East Timorese representatives meant that no attempts were made to 
justify policies from a Timorese perspective.86 The third section will explore these 
examples in more detail.    
 
 
III   REFERENDUM LAWS IN EAST TIMOR AND MONTENEGRO 
 
This section will summarise the laws that applied to East Timor and 
Montenegro’s referenda, and will briefly outline how they will be discussed in the 
application section. 
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A   East Timor 
 
Before East Timor’s Fretilin party unilaterally declared independence in 1975, 
Timor had formed part of the Portuguese empire for over 400 years.87 Citing concern 
at the prospect of having a potentially unstable neighbour, Indonesia invaded Timor 9 
days after the declaration of independence.88 When he replaced Suharto as Indonesia’s 
President in 1998, Habibie agreed to hold a referendum to settle Timor’s status.89 
During the referendum almost 80% of East Timorese voted in favour of 
independence.90    
There were three primary legal documents that established guidelines for the 1999 
referendum in East Timor. They were each formed by negotiation between the UN, and 
the Portuguese and Indonesian governments. It will later be argued that the outcome of 
these negotiations suffered from a lack of reciprocity. The first legal document was a 
basic agreement that covered the broad political issues. It was supplemented by two 
more specific agreements: one established more detailed requirements for the 
referendum process, including the campaign period; and the other concerned security 
arrangements during the referendum.91 They are known collectively as the 5 May 
Agreement. 
The Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic 
on the question of East Timor (East Timor Agreement) established the basic framework 
for East Timor’s constitutional referendum.92 It requested that special autonomy for 
East Timor be determined through ‘popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret 
and universal ballot’,93 organised by ‘an appropriate United Nations mission in East 
Timor … [established] to effectively carry out the consultation’.94 If the East Timorese 
people rejected its proposal for special autonomy within Indonesia, the East Timor 
Agreement proposed a ‘peaceful and orderly transfer of authority in East Timor’ from 
the Indonesian government ‘to the United Nations … enabling East Timor to begin a 
process of transition to independence’.95  
The details were laid out more specifically in the Agreement regarding the 
modalities for the popular consultation of the East Timorese through a direct ballot 
(Modalities Agreement).96 It deals with two primary areas: the campaign period and 
referendum procedure. 
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1   Campaign Stage 
 
The Modalities Agreement established rules controlling the distribution of 
information during the campaign, both by the United Nations and by parties for or 
against the proposal for special autonomy. It stated that the United Nations should 
make the text of the main agreement and autonomy document available in Tetum, 
Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese and English, and ‘disseminate and explain … [them] in 
an impartial and factual manner’.97 Additionally, it should ‘explain to voters the 
process and procedure of the vote’.98 Under the agreement, this information would be 
distributed through ‘the radio stations and newspapers in East Timor as well as other 
Indonesian and Portuguese media outlets … [or] other appropriate means of 
dissemination … as required’.99 Finally, the Modalities Agreement obliged the United 
Nations to ‘provide equal opportunity for both sides to disseminate their views to the 
public’.100  
As well as information distribution by the United Nations, the Modalities 
Agreement regulated campaigning by supporters or opponents of the autonomy 
proposal. It compelled them to ‘campaign ahead of the vote in a peaceful and orderly 
manner’101 in accordance with a code of conduct ‘proposed by the United Nations and 
discussed with the supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal’.102 The code of 
conduct called for both sides to allow the other to campaign free from disruption or 
obstruction, and to avoid inflammatory language and defamation.103  
Because there were no East Timorese representatives in the negotiations, parties 
were not required to accept FTSCs by attempting to justify their position from a 
Timorese perspective. The third section will argue that this meant the campaign laws 
were not based on reciprocity, and hence damaged their effectiveness by limiting voter 
education to largely procedural content and by weakening the laws’ suitability for local 
conditions. 
 
 
2   Referendum Procedure 
 
Regarding the referendum procedure, the 5 May Agreement’s most significant 
provisions prescribed a referendum question, the prerequisites for voting eligibility, 
and security arrangements during the referendum. The application section will only 
discuss security arrangements, but all three areas will be briefly summarised. The 
question to be put to voters was: 
 
Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State 
of the Republic of Indonesia? OR do you reject the proposed special autonomy for 
East Timor, leading to East Timor’s separation from Indonesia?104 
 
Adults over 17 were eligible to vote if they were born in East Timor, had at least 
one parent born in East Timor, or were married to someone from either category.105 
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The final major agreement concerned security. Under its terms, Indonesia, 
Portugal and the United Nations agreed that responsibility for ensuring a free and fair 
referendum in East Timor ‘rests with the appropriate Indonesian security 
authorities’.106 It made the Indonesian police ‘solely responsible for the maintenance of 
law and order’ during the referendum, as well as for supervising the transport of ballot 
papers to and from polling sites.107 The application section will suggest these security 
arrangements were ineffective, and would have been improved by a stronger emphasis 
on reciprocity in the negotiations, achieved through Timorese representation in the 
discussion, along with impartial mediation to offset Indonesia’s strong bargaining 
position.     
 
B   Montenegro 
 
Montenegro was recognised as an independent state in 1878, but was 
incorporated into Yugoslavia following the First World War.108 As rising nationalism 
and a series of political and economic crises triggered Yugoslavia’s breakup, 
Montenegro voted in a 1992 referendum to remain part of Yugoslavia, which created 
the less centralised union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2002.109 Nevertheless there 
were tensions within the federation,110 and a 2006 referendum eventually affirmed 
Montenegro’s independence with 55.5% support.111 
Unlike the case of Timor, Montenegro’s referendum laws were generally based 
on reciprocity, having used defensible justifications that could be accepted by all 
reasonable citizens. This reciprocity can be attributed to the parties’ willingness to 
accept FTSCs and to accommodate their opponents’ views using EMD, encouraged by 
representative participation and the EU’s impartial moderation of the negotiations. This 
section will broadly summarise the laws’ content, as well as identifying more specific 
provisions that will be discussed in the application section.    
The laws that apply to Montenegro’s referendum came from negotiations between 
pro-union and pro-independence groups, with the European Union as an 
interlocutor.112 These negotiations produced the Law on the Referendum on State Legal 
Status (LRSLS), which the Montenegrin Parliament adopted on 1 March 2006.113 This 
superseded the older Law on Referendum of the Republic of Montenegro (Law on 
Referendum).114 The new legislation was strongly influenced by an opinion on the old 
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legislation’s compatibility with international standards for referendum organisation 
issued by the Venice Commission, an EU advisory body on constitutional matters.115 
As in East Timor, the relevant legal provisions can be broadly separated into those 
covering the campaign period, and those concerning the referendum procedure.  
 
1   Campaign Stage 
 
At the campaign stage, the LRSLS primarily addressed campaign financing, both 
sides’ conduct during the campaign, and media coverage. The Montenegrin 
government gave parties in favour of each referendum option €1 million to finance 
their campaign. Private donations were capped and their disclosure made mandatory.116 
Campaign conduct was regulated by the requirement that they refrain from ‘defamation 
and libel, infringement of the rules of decency, and insults to the public feeling’.117  
Media coverage was compelled to ‘assist voters during the referendum process in 
making an informed choice… in particular by means of specific information programs 
and public debates involving both referendum options’.118 The aim was to uphold the 
citizens’ right to be informed about both referendum options in ‘a truthful, timely and 
unbiased manner’.119 Public television and radio were required to report major 
developments for both referendum options, including press releases, major speeches 
and debates.120  
The LRSLS’s broad contents have been described for context. In the application 
section, the process leading up to two specific provisions will be analysed more 
closely. Firstly, the LRSLS established a public media monitoring body to report on 
media independence. The body was evenly composed of both referendum options’ 
supporters,121 and was not granted coercive powers.122 Secondly, the LRSLS specified 
that the chairperson of the referendum’s final appeal board would come from overseas, 
‘appointed by the Assembly from amongst the relevant European organisations’.123 As 
the third section will demonstrate, both of these provisions resulted from a mutual 
exchange of reasons and agreement based on EMD, facilitated by EU mediation. 
 
3   Referendum Procedure 
 
The LRSLS provisions on the referendum procedure emphasised having a clear 
question, and requiring a clear majority.124 It said the question would be ‘do you want 
the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with full international and legal 
personality?’.125 Other provisions defined the requirements for voting. Article 3 limited 
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referendum participation to citizens who had voting rights under the pre-existing 
referendum law.126 This included Montenegrin citizens over 18 who had lived in 
Montenegro for at least two years leading up to the polling date, but not non-
residents.127  
Finally, as will be discussed in the next section, it also entrenched a 55% vote as 
the necessary majority for independence.128 The application section will suggest this 
was an effective outcome, and was based on reciprocity as a result of both sides’ 
willingness to accept FTSCs and employ EMD. To a large extent this was due to the 
EU’s role as facilitator.  
 
IV   APPLICATION – DRAFTING REFERENDUM LAWS BASED ON RECIPROCITY IN EAST 
TIMOR AND MONTENEGRO 
 
This section’s objectives are twofold. Its primary aim is to demonstrate that 
representative participation and impartial mediation in micro-level deliberation can 
facilitate the FTSCs and EMD that help to achieve resolutions that are based on 
reciprocity. In doing so, the discussion will also fulfil a secondary purpose: cautiously 
to affirm reciprocity’s instrumental benefits; in other words, that reciprocity can help 
improve policy-making. These arguments are made using two case studies: East 
Timor’s referendum, where an absence of reciprocity in negotiations, caused by 
Indonesia’s strong bargaining position and the lack of East Timorese representation, 
thwarted the effectiveness of the agreement’s terms; and Montenegro, where 
negotiations resolved disagreements in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. 
This will be illustrated with reference to the campaign regulations during each 
referendum, and the negotiations on security arrangements in East Timor and the 
supermajority requirement in Montenegro. The scarcity of material concerning the 
negotiation processes that created each case’s referendum law means that these 
conclusions can only be tentative, establishing correlation rather than clear causation. 
However various measures have been adopted to maximise the accuracy of any 
conclusions. These include discussing two case studies, and using multiple examples 
from each. Nevertheless, further empirical work – potentially including additional case 
studies – should be conducted to follow up on the theoretical framework developed 
here.  
Obviously circumstances in Montenegro and East Timor were quite different, 
complicating the comparisons between the two. The intention is not to compare them 
directly. Rather, this section will discuss factors contributing to reciprocity’s presence 
or absence in each case’s referendum law individually.  
However there are a number of similarities between the two cases that make it 
reasonable to discuss them together. Both were small, historically-independent states, 
seceding from linguistically and ethnically-distinct, newly-democratic regimes.129 
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Additionally both were facilitated largely by impartial international organisations – the 
UN in East Timor, and EU in Montenegro.130 Finally, although the East Timorese 
referendum was clearly more volatile with hindsight, this was not always apparent. 
Fears that Montenegrin political and social divisions could escalate into violent conflict 
were primarily responsible for the EU’s intervention in Montenegro’s referendum.131 
In 2002 EU officials warned that a vote for secession would destabilise the region and 
suggested considering measures to slow progress towards a referendum.132 Meanwhile, 
the UN Mission in East Timor commenced with a sense of optimism. For instance, 
Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama called early developments in the negotiation 
process ‘very, very positive’.133 
One key difference between the two cases was that East Timor’s micro-level 
participation was not representative, with no Timorese participants and Indonesia 
wielding disproportionate bargaining power.134 Conversely, Montenegro’s negotiations 
included representatives from all major political parties, split evenly between pro and 
anti-independence parties.135 The other key difference was the role of impartial 
mediation. In the Timorese negotiations, weak mediation allowed Indonesia to dictate 
terms, whereas the EU’s mediation during negotiations on Montenegro’s referendum 
law forced both sides to accept FTSCs and seek solutions based on EMD. These 
factors meant Montenegro’s referendum law was more strongly founded in reciprocity 
than East Timor’s.  
 
A   East Timor 
 
The negotiations that generated East Timor’s referendum law lacked East 
Timorese input and were dominated by Indonesian representatives. A UN General 
Assembly resolution calling for ‘the Secretary–General to initiate consultations with 
all [emphasis added] parties directly concerned’136 formed the early basis for 
negotiations on East Timor’s future.137 The subsequent 5 May Agreement was 
negotiated between representatives of the UN and the Portuguese and Indonesian 
governments. There was no East Timorese input – a problem acknowledged by 
Australian Prime Minister John Howard in his letter to the Indonesian President 
Habibie: ‘negotiations with the Portuguese do not give an adequate role for the East 
Timorese themselves… the issue can be resolved only through direct negotiations 
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between Indonesia and East Timorese leaders.’138 Portugal was the closest party to 
representing East Timor’s interests, repeatedly expressing its position that any 
settlement should have full respect for the ‘legitimate rights of the [East Timorese] 
people’ and reach a ‘just, comprehensive and internationally acceptable’ result.139 As 
will be demonstrated below, this was insufficient to make the negotiations’ outcomes 
reciprocal, or based on mutually acceptable justifications. As well as the lack of East 
Timorese representation, an additional factor harming reciprocity during the 
negotiations was Indonesia’s dominant position. Fears that it would withdraw from 
negotiations gave it a de facto veto power,140 precluding the effective exchange of 
mutual justifications and the reaching of solutions based on EMD. This will become 
particularly clear in the discussion of negotiations on security arrangements during 
East Timor’s referendum. Although Indonesia seemed unwilling to justify its position 
or accommodate alternative perspectives, firmer mediation that leveraged Indonesia’s 
reliance on foreign economic aid could have encouraged it to accept FTSCs and 
employ EMD, creating more reciprocal outcomes.  
 
1   Campaign Regulations 
 
In line with the approach taken by the Modalities Agreement, campaigning 
generally focussed on encouraging and instructing people how to vote, at the expense 
of substantive debate. Additionally information distribution methods were ill-suited to 
achieving their purpose. Both of these hindered the campaign period’s potential to 
promote mutual understanding and respect between opposing sides. Although little 
material is available on the negotiations about guidelines for the campaign period, it is 
reasonable to infer that representative participation during negotiations could have 
boosted reciprocity, averting or softening these deficiencies. 
Although the UN acknowledged ‘the pressing need for reconciliation between the 
various competing factions in East Timor’,141 the Modalities Agreement contained no 
provisions to promote reconciliation through spreading knowledge or promoting 
debate. As the UN Secretary-General’s special representative in East Timor wrote, the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) believed it was ‘evident that the 
voter population was already highly motivated [regarding their voting preference].’142 
As a result, the information it provided to voters during the referendum focussed 
mainly on teaching people how to participate, and encouraging them to vote despite 
security fears. As an example, a UN-commissioned poster told voters their vote was 
secret, and that there would be one ballot box in each polling station, one counting 
place in Dili where the votes were tallied, and one final result announced by the UN.143 
However it entirely avoided substantive debate on the merits of either voting option. 
Similarly, as evidence of the success of their information campaign, UN officials focus 
overwhelmingly on quantitative indicators related to information distribution, rather 
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than on voters’ internalisation of the substantive content regarding the referendum 
issues. For instance, the UN Department of Public Information celebrates producing 
over 750,000 pieces of printed material and more than 300 hours of television and 
radio programs, but does not discuss their contents or whether the distribution methods 
were successful.144 This reflects the low significance the Modalities Agreement placed 
on educating voters about the referendum issues.  
The Modalities Agreement does include a token acknowledgement of substantive 
debate, requiring the United Nations to ‘provide equal opportunity for both sides to 
disseminate their views to the public’145 and asking both sides to avoid defamation or 
the use of inflammatory language.146 In practice this had little effect. Pro-independence 
campaigners were so convinced of majority support for independence that they did not 
believe campaigning was necessary.147 The lack of substantive debate was exacerbated 
by militia attacks on pro-independence advocates – for instance, several newly-opened 
National Council of Timorese Resistance offices were attacked and subsequently 
closed.148 Rather than robust debate on the relevant issues, information provided 
during the East Timorese referendum’s campaign period was overwhelmingly 
dominated by dry UN materials that emphasised voting procedure.   
A stronger focus on reciprocity could have helped. The justification provided for 
weak campaign laws – that a pro-independence vote was a foregone conclusion – could 
not be accepted by anyone interested in conducting an informed, fair and legitimate 
referendum.149 Thus it was not an argument that accepted FTSCs.150 Including 
participants in negotiations who had a clearer interest in the referendum’s legitimacy, 
like the Timorese people who would be bound by it, would probably have yielded 
more reciprocal campaign laws. If participants in micro-level negotiations accept that 
the outcome should be justifiable to those who would like to conduct a widely-
accepted referendum, campaign laws that promote well-informed, considered voting 
are the likely result. Montenegro’s laws, for example, gave both voting options €1 
million to finance their campaign,151 and required that media coverage assist voters to 
make an informed decision by reporting major developments on both sides truthfully 
without bias.152 Applying similar requirements in Timor, tailored to local conditions, 
could have increased acceptance of the referendum’s result by boosting provisionality 
and mutual respect between the relevant parties.153 Indonesian and pro-union East 
Timorese were heavily influenced by censorship and propaganda under Suharto’s 
authoritarian government.154 They often had no idea about the real reasons behind East 
Timor’s push for independence.155 Circulating material on the history of East Timor, 
including its occupation by Indonesia and the accompanying human rights abuses 
could have helped the pro-integration faction accept the referendum’s outcome by 
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countering its supporters’ misconceptions.156 It is likely that more reciprocal 
negotiations, with the parties required to justify their positions in mutually acceptable 
terms, would have reached this conclusion.  
Besides lacking substantive content, campaign materials were also distributed in a 
manner that was poorly-suited to local conditions. Again, this could have been avoided 
by representative negotiations, which would have been more likely to deliver 
reciprocal outcomes that were justifiable from a Timorese perspective. The Modalities 
Agreement decreed that information would be distributed through ‘the radio stations 
and newspapers in East Timor as well as other Indonesian and Portuguese media 
outlets … [or] other appropriate means of dissemination … as required’.157 This was 
not effective in practice. As the International Organisation for Migration noted, voter 
education materials were of reasonable quality but needed to be adapted to local 
conditions.158 In 2001 only 2% of the East Timorese population spoke English and 
only 5% Portuguese,159 with monolingualism extremely rare.160 This meant it was 
probably unnecessary for the law to require that all campaign materials be translated 
into Indonesian, Tetum, Portuguese and English.161  As specified by the Modalities 
agreement, distribution took place primarily through newspapers and radio. In a 
country with a 50% illiteracy rate, distribution through newspapers could not have 
been very effective, nor could the UN’s 700,000 pieces of printed materials.162 Radio 
and television materials were also problematic. The Indonesian invasion and 
subsequent 24 year occupation destroyed the majority of East Timor’s already limited 
infrastructure,163 meaning television and radio could only be received in certain parts 
of the country.164 Information was also distributed orally in person, but this was 
outside the scope of the Modalities Agreement.165 The absence of East Timorese 
representatives during negotiations on the Modalities Agreement meant participants 
were not required – or perhaps even able – to consider whether their approach could be 
justified under local conditions. Thus the inadequacies of campaign information 
distribution in Timor stemmed from a lack of reciprocity caused by unrepresentative 
participation in negotiations.    
 
2   Security Arrangements 
 
Although it seems likely that the East Timor’s campaign laws suffered because 
the negotiations that formulated them did not aim to achieve resolutions based on 
reciprocity, insufficient evidence remains from the negotiations conclusively to link the 
two. There are no such problems in establishing that a lack of reciprocity contributed to 
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the May 5 Agreements’ most significant failing:166 delegating security arrangements to 
the Indonesian police and army.167 As with East Timor’s campaign guidelines, the 
absence of reciprocity – here created by Indonesia’s strong bargaining position and 
overbearing approach to negotiations – resulted in outcomes that were unsuccessful in 
practice. This section will also suggest that outcomes based on reciprocity could have 
been achieved by firmer mediation that aimed to encourage FTSCs and EMD.   
The Agreement Regarding Security allocated responsibility for ensuring a free 
and fair referendum to ‘the appropriate Indonesian security authorities’.168 The 
Indonesian government did not fulfil its mandate to maintain law and order in East 
Timor during the referendum. During a visit to Dili in 1999, Irish Foreign Minister 
David Andrews witnessed ‘savage and outrageous brutality against innocent civilians’ 
and noted the Indonesian authorities’ failure ‘despite repeated representations to them, 
to fulfil their obligation to provide adequate security’.169 This prediction was borne out 
in practice, with security arrangements proving to be inadequate. The Australian 
volunteer observer group overseeing the referendum noted it was ‘conducted in an 
atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, largely sponsored by militia violence and threats to 
use force’.170 Indonesian involvement was not merely passive – the East Timorese 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation identified a number of mass 
atrocities committed by anti-independence militias with direct support from the 
Indonesian military.171 This support included arming militia groups, along with 
providing logistical help in organising them.172 The Indonesian security authorities 
failed to discharge their responsibility to maintain law and order during the 
referendum.   
If negotiations on security arrangements were justified using reasons that were 
acceptable from an East Timorese perspective, the Indonesian authorities would not 
have been made responsible for security. Jose Ramos-Horta, then a leading 
spokesperson in favour of East Timorese independence, summarised the prevailing 
view in a letter of protest to Kofi Annan: ‘Our people … are expected to vote on their 
future with ‘protection’ provided by the very same army and gang of criminals that 
have turned the country into a hell far worse than Kosovo and apartheid’s South 
Africa.’173 Instead, he suggested that both the Indonesian military presence and pro-
Independence FALINTIL guerrilla forces should be reduced to beneath 1000 troops, 
with the United Nations made solely responsible for security.174 According to him, 
failing to do so would be a ‘recipe for disaster’.175  
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The probable inadequacy of security arrangements was a known issue during 
negotiations. The UN’s original draft of the Agreement Regarding Security required 
the Indonesian government to disband all pro-integration militia groups and withdraw 
the majority of its troops from East Timor, confining those that remained to barracks 
from one month before the referendum.176 The Indonesian government merely deleted 
these sections, and Indonesian military leaders refused to meet a UN negotiating team 
sent to Jakarta to discuss the issue.177 Portugal’s later suggestion that negotiations be 
reopened to add provisions requiring militia disarmament was abandoned for fear that 
Habibie would withdraw Indonesia from the process.178  In discussing security 
arrangements, Indonesia did not meet the most basic requirement for reciprocity: 
accepting FTSCs.179 It refused to justify its position in mutually accessible terms. 
Additionally, attempting to give reasons that others could reasonably accept implies 
also being open to considering reasonable reasons offered by others.180 Indonesia was 
not open to considering alternative suggestions on security arrangements. This 
reluctance to accept fair terms of social cooperation meant negotiations on security 
arrangements were unlikely to achieve mutually-justifiable solutions.  
In fact, there were mutually accessible reasons the Indonesian government could 
have used to support its stance: relinquishing responsibility over security in East Timor 
would have been extremely unpopular domestically. Having an international security 
force on Indonesian soil was seen to encroach on Indonesia’s sovereignty.181 However, 
Indonesia did not appear to have accepted FTSCs, merely threatening to withdraw 
from negotiations if it did not get its way.182 As described in the theory section, if it did 
attempt to give mutually accessible reasons, that would have made negotiations a 
deliberative disagreement, meaning a resolution based on moral accommodation and 
EMD might have been sought.183 Finding common ground between the Indonesian 
government’s desire to save face and the importance of effective, non-partisan security 
arrangements could probably have achieved an effective compromise. For instance, 
one possibility that could have provided effective security without embarrassing 
Indonesia or intruding on its sovereignty was building East Timor’s capacity to deliver 
its own security by offering it military training and supplies.184 Mutually-justifiable 
solutions to Timor’s security dilemma based on accommodation were achievable, but 
Indonesia’s high-handed approach to negotiations precluded this possibility.    
Although the Indonesian government did not seem willing to consider alternative 
perspectives, there were no significant attempts to encourage it to find more reciprocal 
solutions. A variety of levers were available to encourage the Indonesian government 
to soften its position on security, in favour of a new stance that could be justified in 
mutually acceptable terms. Indonesia’s reliance on foreign economic aid in the 
aftermath of its 1997 financial crash made it sensitive to foreign opinion.185 Nevins 
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suggests this could have been exploited to persuade Indonesia to consider alternative 
perspectives.186 An impartial mediator, like the UN, would have been well-placed to 
leverage Indonesia’s sensitivity to global opinion and reliance on foreign funds to 
encourage it to be more accommodating, resulting in more mutually justifiable laws. 
As will soon be discussed, the EU successfully employed a similar approach during 
negotiations on Montenegro’s referendum law.  
 
B   Montenegro 
 
By contrast, both sides during negotiations on the Montenegrin referendum were 
prepared to justify their beliefs and accommodate the other’s views. Unlike in East 
Timor, where Indonesia wielded disproportionate power, the European Union had the 
strongest bargaining position during drafting negotiations for Montenegro’s LRSLS. 
The two other groups involved in the negotiations were a coalition of representatives 
from pro-independence parties in Montenegro, and another equally-sized group 
composed from pro-union parties.187 The EU’s patient, determined use of soft power – 
including its discretion over Serbia and Montenegro’s future EU membership – gave it 
leverage over both sides’ conduct in negotiations.188 The power to order the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s withdrawal from observing the 
referendum, thereby undermining the referendum’s legitimacy, also enhanced the EU’s 
clout.189  As a neutral arbiter, it used this influence to encourage the parties to engage 
in quasi-reciprocal negotiations. The EU’s mediation was vital – it was clear that the 
two sides alone could not agree on referendum ground rules or the vote threshold 
necessary to trigger secession.190 Pressure exerted on both sides to reach an agreement 
forced them to seek mutually-acceptable terms, and the effective negotiation outcomes 
demonstrate the potential for representative participation and independent mediation in 
negotiations to deliver results based on reciprocity. Although some minor parties from 
each bloc were obstructive,191 the majority on both sides generally sought to abide by 
FTSCs, meaning each side sought to justify its positions in terms that could be 
accepted by the other.192 In circumstances where this failed, such as negotiations on the 
necessary majority requirement, EMD was employed to reach solutions based on moral 
accommodation.  
The negotiation process sought political common ground between the sides. It 
began with an EU-authored document that outlined key points for negotiations to 
address, and continued with both parties supplying the EU with their positions on each 
point.193 Based on these responses, the EU endeavored to find common ground 
between pro-union and pro-independence blocs during the subsequent negotiations.194 
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The eventual 2006 special referendum law was based on a consensus in negotiations, 
and was adopted by the Montenegrin Parliament with bipartisan support.195  
The potential for mediation and representative participation to promote FTSCs 
and EMD, consequently delivering more reciprocal outcomes in micro-level 
participation will now be discussed in relation to laws governing Montenegro’s 
campaign period and supermajority requirement.  
 
1   Campaign Period 
 
Unlike in Timor, participants in Montenegro’s more representative and firmly 
moderated negotiations were made to accept FTSC and resolved disagreements using 
EMD. As a result, the laws that applied to its campaign period were more reciprocal, 
grounded in justifications that could be accepted by all reasonable citizens. Examples 
that will be discussed included compromises on the composition of referendum 
administration bodies and the regulating of state media.    
A compromise on state media regulation provides one example of the potential 
for economy of moral disagreement, encouraged through mediation, to resolve disputes 
in line with reciprocity. Going into negotiations, the pro-union faction was concerned 
that the ruling pro-independence parties would use their influence over state media to 
advocate their position.196 This concern was based partly on experiences during the 
1992 referendum that created the union between Serbia and Montenegro, which was 
strongly influenced by media propaganda.197 On the other hand, pro-independence 
parties feared that adopting the pro-unionists’ suggestion for an ad-hoc parliamentary 
body to be granted powers to regulate media content would politicise public 
broadcasting, which was supposed to be independent.198 Shuttling between pro-
independence and pro-union representatives, EU mediators found a compromise based 
on EMD.199 A parliamentary body was established to monitor media content, but not 
given coercive powers.200 Furthermore it would be evenly composed of representatives 
from both sides of the referendum debate.201 This delivered a mutually-acceptable 
solution. It enabled pro-unionists’ desired oversight over public media, but without 
triggering pro-independence politicians’ fears that media outlets’ independence might 
be compromised.202  
Both sides’ acceptance of FTSCs and the pursuit of resolutions based on EMD 
can also be seen in relation to disputes over the nature of bodies that would administer 
the referendum. Once again, this achieved resolutions consistent with reciprocity. 
Initially, the EU proposed that both sides of the referendum debate be represented 
equally on administrative bodies, but the pro-independence bloc objected that this 
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would allow pro-unionists to undermine the referendum by boycotting the bodies.203 
Earlier on, the pro-independence parties had expressed the opinion that international 
involvement should be minimal, while the pro-union bloc requested that international 
representatives should fill important positions in administrative bodies to ensure 
democratic standards were observed.204 Following negotiations the pro-independence 
parties overturned their initial objection to international involvement, agreeing that the 
chairman of the final appeal board for administrative disputes be drawn from 
overseas.205 This averted fears that opposition parties could undermine the referendum 
by boycotting administrative bodies, and ensured there would be independent oversight 
over democratic standards during the referendum campaign, without unduly intruding 
on Montenegro’s sovereignty. Although neither party was willing to compromise on its 
own initiative, EU mediation ensured a solution based on EMD that balanced all 
participants’ interests.  
Montenegro’s referendum law maintained a generally dignified and respectful 
campaign on both sides. In line with the LRSLS, campaigning was generally civil.206 
Claims made by the pro-independence campaign were viewed as credible.207 Although 
it appealed to romantic historical notions of regaining the independence their 
forefathers lost during World War I, it also made more contemporary, pragmatic 
arguments for independence.208 For instance, it proposed that Montenegro’s 
subservient role in the federation with Serbia meant its interests were sidelined, 
including that an independent Montenegro with full fiscal powers would be best able to 
fulfil its economic potential.209 Pro-independence campaigns also argued that 
Montenegro’s union with Serbia associated it with Serbia’s refusal to cooperate with 
the international community on a number of issues, harming Montenegro’s aspirations 
to join the EU.210 Similarly, the pro-union side’s campaign was also largely respectful 
and informative. Momir Bulatovic, leader of the People’s Socialist Party of 
Montenegro, which formed part of the pro-union bloc, pledged to campaign without 
‘inciting hatred and nationalistic divisions’ to ‘enable citizens’ peaceful and tolerant 
voting for either option’.211 Although they both ended up spending significantly more, 
the €1 million provided to both sides under the LRSLS gave them sufficient 
opportunities to campaign, including access to advertising.212 Montenegrin campaign 
laws generally upheld civil campaigning and equality of opportunity.  There is 
insufficient evidence from negotiations to directly link this improved campaign tone to 
the principle of reciprocity.  
However there does appear to be a correlation: Montenegrin negotiations 
proceeded on FTSCs with representative participation and the mutual exchange of 
justifications for stances, and created a legal framework that effectively maintained an 
ideal campaign environment. By contrast, negotiations in East Timor which were 
characterised by power imbalances, non-cooperation and unrepresentativeness created 
campaign laws that did not generate sufficient substantive debate and were 
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inappropriate under local conditions. As described earlier, there are also more concrete 
examples. Negotiations on the regulation of state media and the design of referendum 
administration bodies demonstrate the potential for FTSCs and EMD, encouraged by 
independent mediators, to achieve mutually justifiable outcomes. Negotiations on 
Montenegro’s supermajority requirement, discussed below, provide further support for 
this claim.  
 
2   Supermajority Requirement 
 
Montenegro’s requirement that a pro-independence vote must achieve over 55% 
to have any effect is often cited as a major reason behind the referendum’s smooth 
operation.213 This was a figure reached through the exchange of mutually accessible 
justifications and EMD, enforced by EU mediation.   
The original Montenegrin referendum law passed in 2001 required a simple 
majority vote for independence.214 However when the new LRSLS was being drafted, 
the Venice Commission noted that a higher threshold could help the result ‘command 
more respect’.215 It was careful not to recommend an actual buffer without first 
receiving domestic input, stressing the importance of obtaining the widest possible 
domestic consensus.216  Balancing the two sides’ submissions in response to this 
recommendation, the EU recommended a 55% majority requirement to trigger 
secession that was ‘tailor-made for Montenegro’.217 The pro-independence bloc 
initially rejected this suggestion as unfair and undemocratic, since it would potentially 
allow a minority to dictate the result.218 In response, it was noted that a 50% threshold 
is arbitrary, and should arguably be higher for significant changes like secession.219 As 
an example, negotiations noted that the US Constitution can only be amended with a 
two thirds majority.220 On the other side, raising the threshold above 50% was enough 
to convince pro-union supporters that they had a chance, preventing them from 
boycotting elections.221 Eventually the suggestion was accepted by both sides – albeit 
reluctantly by the pro-independence faction.222 55% satisfied pro-union parties’ belief 
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that something higher than a simple majority was necessary to approve major decisions 
like secession, but was not a prohibitively high figure for pro-independence parties to 
reach. It was the only threshold that both sides would accept,223 and was reached 
through a process that involved the exchange of reasons and solutions based on EMD, 
balancing both sides’ positions. This was facilitated by the wide spectrum of affected 
interests represented in negotiations, along with firm and decisive, but impartial 
mediation by the EU.   
In hindsight, the 55% threshold is viewed as a good decision. It was high enough 
to prevent a pro-unionist boycott, encouraged mobilisation on both sides due to the 
likelihood of a close result, and ensured a 10% buffer between the winning and losing 
sides, thereby boosting the result’s legitimacy.224 Furthermore there was wide cross-
party support for the agreed referendum law throughout the campaign.225 Thus 
Montenegro’s supermajority requirement is an example of FTSCs and EMD delivering 
effective laws based on reciprocity, with widespread support.    
 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
 
Tierney suggests decision-making processes should build openness and goodwill 
between the parties and reach agreement through discussion wherever possible, to 
ensure the process is accepted even by those who disagree with the result.226 Gutmann 
and Thompson’s conception of reciprocity – that laws should be defensible using 
justifications that can be accepted by all reasonable citizens – can help accomplish this. 
Mutually-justifiable outcomes can be achieved if both parties accept fair terms of 
social cooperation, and resolve moral impasses using economy of moral disagreement. 
These ideals can be promoted by impartial mediators, as well as by ensuring 
participation in micro-level negotiations is representative. 
East Timor’s campaign regulations were not based on reciprocity. Neither its 
focus on teaching people about the voting process rather than promoting substantive 
debate on the relevant issues, nor its information distribution methods, could be 
justified from a Timorese perspective. These issues would probably have been resolved 
if negotiations were more representative. Conversely in Montenegro, negotiations 
included a wide range of participants and were effectively mediated by the EU. They 
built a legal framework that generated laws based on reciprocity. Although there is 
insufficient evidence available conclusively to link these more reciprocal campaign 
laws to representative participation and effective mediation in negotiations, there is a 
clear correlation. East Timor’s negotiations were unrepresentative and weakly 
mediated, meaning parties were not required to accept fair terms of social cooperation. 
They also generated campaign laws that were not mutually justifiable. On the other 
hand, participants in Montenegro’s more representative and firmly moderated 
negotiations accepted fair terms of social cooperation and resolved disagreements 
using economy of moral disagreement. They also created a legal framework for the 
campaign period that was more reciprocal, grounded in justifications that could be 
accepted by all reasonable citizens. It is conceivable – even likely – that the exchange 
of ideas and the resultant deliberation and modification of views were responsible for 
Montenegro’s more reciprocal campaign laws. Montenegrin negotiators’ compromises 
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on the composition of referendum administration bodies and the regulating of state 
media provide concrete examples of this. 
More material is available concerning negotiations on the most controversial 
issue in each referendum: security arrangements in East Timor and the supermajority 
requirement in Montenegro. In these cases, there is a clear link between FTSCs, EMD, 
and the law’s reciprocity. The lack of East Timorese representation and Indonesia’s 
unwillingness to accept fair terms of social cooperation, facilitated by the UN’s 
reluctance to impose itself as an impartial third-party mediator, were responsible for 
the East Timor referendum’s non-reciprocal security arrangements. On the other hand, 
mutual reason-giving and the eventual adoption of a solution that was acceptable to 
both sides, enabled by representative participation and encouraged by EU mediation, 
created a supermajority requirement in Montenegro that was grounded in reciprocity.     
  
